gene tb1 has pleiotropic effects on plant and inflorescent architecture. Nat. Genet. 38, 594-597. 9 In testing the 'social brain hypothesis' with comparative data, most research has used group size as an index of cognitive challenge. Recent work suggests that this measure is too crude to apply to a wide range of species, and biologists may need to develop other ways of extending these analyses.
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The overall size of the brain and the relative enlargement of its component parts vary widely across species. Part of this variation can be accounted for by allometric changes with body size, and part by correlated increases among many brain parts linked by developmental constraints; but much remains to be explained as adaptive variation. In pinning down the sources of this variation, the usual approach is to seek correlations with environmental challenges faced by different species. To do that, it is necessary to index the possible challenges in a robust and simple way, so that a large number of species can be included in the analysis. In this way, social complexity, a key cognitive challenge according to the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis [1] , has usually been reduced simply to group size. Admittedly crude, this at least captures the idea that information-processing demands should, on average, increase with the number of social relationships an individual has to deal with [2] . Anthropoid primates are a paradigm case where this is true [3] , and species with larger neocortex do indeed live in larger groups [4] . Moreover, the same principle seems to apply in other taxa: chiropteran bat species that show stable social groups have larger neocortex than those that do not [5] , and the most social cetacean species are also those with the largest brains [6] . There is reason, therefore, to think that the selective effect on brain enlargement from social complexity -as measured by group size -is a general one at least in mammals. Recently, Shultz and Dunbar [7, 8] have increased the level of sophistication in such analyses by including another measure of social complexity: a species' social organization. They found powerful effects on brain size in all taxa analysed.
Firstly for even-toed ungulates [7] , a group with a convenient lack of dietary complexity, and now also for carnivores and birds [8] , Shultz and Dunbar report that, whereas group size has weak and often inconsistent effects on relative brain size, a species' social system is closely related to the size of its brain. Intriguingly, in these non-primate species they found monogamy to be more closely associated with brain enlargement than is group size; it was not the highly competitive, multi-male mating systems which were particularly linked to brain enlargement, but rather having harems and especially pair-bonding. In contrast, among primates, multi-male mating systems (and larger group sizes) were associated with the greatest brain enlargement. Do these findings invalidate earlier work which suggested that group size is important for a wide range of taxa? (An implication even of some of the authors' own earlier work: Dunbar and Bever [9] reported that in carnivores and advanced insectivores, group size correlates with neocortex enlargement.) Maybe not. In Shultz and Dunbar's recent studies [7, 8] , group size was defined by the geometric mean of reported aggregation sizes -which may deliver very different results in different species, depending on the nature of their typical groupings. As we put it in a recent article [1] , ''The logic of [Machiavellian intelligence] theory will only apply if a social group is a semi-permanent aggregation. Temporary groupings, such as flocks of non-breeding ducks on lakes, migrating herds of ungulates, or fish schools attacking krill are not predicted to have any such selective effect on intelligence: not all sociality is cognitively demanding.'' The definition of group used in Shultz and Dunbar's analyses [7, 8] does not exclude such temporary groupings: they refer to groups that are ''little more than aggregations and exhibit a fluid structure: individuals join and leave the group as their needs, and the environment, dictate''.
So what is cognitively demanding about some social groupings? Nicholas Humphrey [10] was responsible for the seminal article arguing that social complexity has been a major spur to the evolution of intelligence. He suggested some answers: ''the presence of dependants (young, injured, infirm) . conflicts of interest among the members of any community which spans more than a single generation . complex kinship structures''. If so, complexity is not an automatic consequence of the number of individuals in a social group: a large but anonymous aggregation may be socially simple. Rather, complexity is a function of the range and subtlety of behaviour expressed by group members [11] . Group size can therefore only be a useful proxy for social complexity if groups are composed of animals who know others individually, who notice information about others' demeanour, rank, kinship and past history of give-and-take, and who use this information in social problem-solving. Primatologists have repeatedly emphasized that primates compete by subtle tactics of social manipulation far more than most species, so it is natural that for primates social knowledge is at a premium even in mating contests [12] .
Shultz and Dunbar's [7, 8] work is valuable in showing that, on the whole, birds, ungulates and carnivores form aggregations that do not impose cognitive demands: for them, evolutionary success in a multi-male mating system is not particularly dependent on brainpower, whereas for primates it is. In primates, 'aggregations' are long-lasting associations in which individuals must continually cope with each other's demands, and living in such semi-permanent groups may impose cognitive demands on any species. Comparing across taxa illustrates this point. Using the geometric mean of reported aggregations to define a group, red deer, eland and kob form similar-sized groups to chimpanzee communities and baboon troops; reindeer are seen in far larger groups. Yet no ungulate zoologist would claim that these deer and antelope have to deal with social problems that require knowledge of kinship, rank or past history of give-and-take, as do the primates. In the temporary mating aggregations of even-toed ungulates, disputes are settled with body strength and weaponry. Among carnivores, counts are more likely to indicate semi-permanent groups. But while badgers and gorillas share the same group size, most of a badger's waking life is spent entirely on its own, and to develop a working definition of group across this diverse order may prove just as elusive.
We must be careful not to jump to the conclusion that a biological term, such as 'group', has the same meaning to all who use it. Shultz and Dunbar's [7, 8] findings emphasise the importance, in terms of social information processing, of coping with differentiated relationships. Unless we can be sure that group size is giving an indication of the size of a social network, its usefulness as a proxy variable for social complexity in large-scale comparative analyses may have come to an end. For taxa where group size is not useful, other measures of social complexity, such as mating system, time spent engaged in social activity, or the particular manner in which individuals compete, may give more useful scales against which to test theories of brain evolution.
